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ARGUMENT 
I. The State cannot obtain immunity by recharacterizing Appellants' plain-
stated negligence claims 
The State admits, as it must, that Appellants' suit is "for damages allegedly 
caused by the State's negligence in supervising a parolee and in failing to warn them 
about [the parolee]." State Br. at 1-2 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the State argues 
that the Governmental Immunity Act immunizes it from Appellants' suit - arising from 
the negligence of state employees - because the State has recharacterized the injury at 
issue as also arising from a third party's "deceit." State Br. at 2. 
Three points in response: First, this is not, as the State states, an argument resting 
in the "plain language" of the statute. The Governmental Immunity Act plainly waives 
immunity for lawsuits seeking recovery from the State for injuries arising from the 
negligence of a governmental "employee committed within the scope of employment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4). By implication, the plain reading of the following 
subsection of the code excepts from that waiver only those injuries arising out of "deceit" 
by that governmental employee. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(b). The State 
eventually acknowledges that its argument rests not on the plain reading of the statute, 
but on an unprecedented extension of the Taylor and Ledfors line of cases, which only 
concern assault and battery, and on the very same argument the Supreme Court rejected 
in State v. Francis, 2010 UT 62 f 17, 248 P.3d 44 (rejecting the State's argument that 
"governmental immunity attaches when the injury has any causal connection to the 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exception claimed regardless of the status of the actor directly responsible for the 
injury"). State Br. at 13. ' 
Second, the State's argument rests in its recharacterization of Appellants' claims. 
The State asserts, falsely, that Appellants "do not dispute that their injuries resulted from 
the tort of deceit." State Br. at 11. No, that is exactly the point of this appeal. 
Appellants brought suit against the State for "damages allegedly caused by the State's 
negligence." State Br. at 1-2. In its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the State recharacterized 
Appellants' claims as if they were brought against the State for deceit - seeking to 
shoehorn Appellants' allegations into an exception to the State's waiver of governmental 
immunity that does not apply. But it is well-established that the Governmental Immunity 
Act does not immunize the State from its negligence simply because there may be 
another proximate cause of the harm suffered. See Day v. State, 1999 UT 46 \ 21, 980 
P.2d 1171, 1178 (Utah 1999) (rejecting the argument that the State was not responsible 
for the harm caused by the suspect in a high-speed chase on the grounds that the pursuing 
officer "had a duty of care to other users of the highways and streets," and that officer's 
"conduct could be found to be a proximate cause of the [plaintiffs'] injuries if they were 
reasonably foreseeable").1 Thus, the district court should not have dismissed Appellants' 
claims for negligent supervision and failure to warn simply because the parolee was also 
1
 Similarly, the State's position is contrary to the well-pleaded complaint rule that 
recognizes that plaintiffs are "masters of their complaint" - having the right to choose 
who to sue and what claims to bring. See Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 94 
(2005) (defendants are prohibited from "transforming the action"); see also Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 387 (1987) (plaintiffs could have brought certain claims 
but "they, as masters of the complaint, chose not to do so."). 
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question first may lead to unwarranted assumptions and confiision about undecided duty 
problems."). 
II. The deceit exception to the immunity waiver does not apply in this case. 
A. The Court's decision in Francis, as well as legislative history, demonstrate 
that the status of a tortfeasor is relevant for purposes of the deceit exception. 
The State attempts to distinguish Francis on the grounds that it was limited to the 
"permit" exception to the waiver of immunity. State Br. at 17. But the Court in Francis 
rejected the precise argument the State is making here: that "governmental immunity 
attaches when the injury has any causal connection to the exception claimed regardless of 
the status of the actor directly responsible for the injury." Francis, 2010 UT 62, f 17. 
Precisely because a tortfeasor's status is relevant, the Francis decision distinguished 
Taylor, Ledfors, and Peck, holding that the State could not claim immunity based on the 
acts of a third party, the federal government. Id. f 22 ("[T]he State cannot claim 
governmental immunity for actions wholly conducted by the federal government."). 
Critical to the Francis court's decision was the fact that "the State did not perform any 
act that falls within the scope of the permit exception." Id. f 16. Likewise, in this case, 
Appellants have not based their claim on any act by the State that falls within the scope 
of the deceit exception. Rather, the State is again seeking to "import provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act at [its] pleasure to shield [itself] from claims of 
negligence." Id. Further, the Francis court made an important distinction from those 
cases in which the State was allowed to claim immunity for the actions of a third party. 
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dissenting). In her thorough examination of the Act, Justice Durham concluded: "[i]t 
makes very little sense, given the purposes of the statute, to say that the state is immune 
from suit for its negligence because a private individual has fortuitously committed an 
assault or battery also contributing to the injury." Id. at 169. Further, she appropriately 
pointed out that "the legislature intended to compensate victims injured by governmental 
negligence, but not for injuries caused by the intentional torts of government employees. 
Hence, under the Act, the status of the intentional tortfeasor does matter." Id. at 168. 
The status of a tortfeasor is relevant. Inasmuch as the State argues that cases like 
Taylor and Ledfors v. Emery Cnty. Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993), stand for the 
proposition that all 301(5)(b) exceptions also apply to the actions of third parties, the 
Court should find now as Justice Durham and Associate Chief Justice Stewart found in 
the Taylor dissent: "[Ledfors] was wrongly decided." Taylor, 927 P.2d at 165. But the 
Court need not go there. The Court's recent decision in Francis, as well as the legislative 
history and underlying purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act, demonstrate that the 
State should not be permitted to claim immunity based upon the deceptive actions of a 
third party that may have also contributed to the harm. Accordingly, the district court 
erred when it found that the State retained immunity based upon the deceit exception 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(b). 
B. The district court's attachment of the deceit exception to the actions of third 
parties is a violation of the principles of statutory construction. 
The State erroneously claims that "[i]f the deceit exception is limited to only 
circumstances where the government employee commits the tort, subsection (f)'s 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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exception for misrepresentation by an employee is superfluous and has no meaning." 
State Br. at 17. The State's claim is unpersuasive, especially because it belies the 
statutory construction principles upon which it is purportedly founded. 
As an initial matter, it bears noting that the position asserted by the State is 
without precedent. The deceit exception in subsection 301(5)(b) has only been applied to 
the deceit of a governmental employee. See Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp., 
797 P.2d 419, 423 (Utah 1990) ("[I]mmunity is not waived for acts or omissions of 
employees acting within the scope of their employment when a plaintiffs injury arises 
out of deceit or misrepresentation by the employee."). 
Essentially, the State claims that deceit is form of misrepresentation. State Br. at 
17 ("Deceit is the 'action or practice of deceiving someone by ... misrepresenting the 
truth.'"). But if deceit is merely a form of misrepresentation, and misrepresentation 
appears as an exception, then the term 'deceit' is rendered superfluous and without 
meaning. This is contrary to the rule of statutory construction by which a court "assumes 
the legislature used each term advisedly." See State Br. at 16 (quoting Marion Energy, 
Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, \ 14, 267 P.3d 863). 
In fact, the State's pairing of deceit and misrepresentation supports Appellants' 
argument that the State should not be able to claim immunity for a third party's deceit. If 
the legislature intended that immunity apply only to the misrepresentations of a 
government employee, then it logically follows that the legislature intended the same for 
deceit, a form of misrepresentation. Additionally, if the Court were to allow the actions 
of third parties to attach to the deceit exception, then the State could never be sued for 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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negligence that could somehow be tied to the misrepresentations of a non-government 
employee. The State could always claim that somehow, somewhere, a third party's 
misrepresentation or deceit was responsible for part of the harm, and therefore, the State 
is immune. Obviously such a result was not the intention of the legislature that waived 
immunity for injuries arising from the negligent acts of its employees. 
In her dissent in Taylor, Justice Durham explained that "the legislature intended to 
compensate victims injured by governmental negligence, but not for injuries caused by 
the intentional torts of government employees." Taylor, 927 P.2d at 168 (Durham, J. 
dissenting). The "by an employee" language of subsection (5)(f) was not intended to 
establish that misrepresentation is the only tort where the tortfeasor's status is relevant. 
Otherwise, this Court would not have found the exact opposite in Francis. 2010 UT 62, f 
17 (rejecting the argument that immunity attaches "regardless of the status of the actor 
directly responsible for the injury."). Rather, the more important language of subsection 
(5)(f) is: "whether or not it is negligent or intentional." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
301(5)(f). The legislature already intended to immunize the government from the 
intentional misrepresentations of government employees; however, in regards to 
misrepresentation, the legislature wanted to further immunize the government from the 
negligent misrepresentations of its employees. By further qualifying subsection (5)(f), 
the legislature was not saying anything about the deceit exception. The legislature was 
merely broadening the reach of immunity in the misrepresentation context. 
Contrary to the State's position, "[a] narrow construction of the deceit exception" 
does not violate any of the "basic rule[s] of statutory construction." State Br. at 17. The 
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legislature's use of "by an employee" in subsection (5)(f) does not somehow expand the 
deceit exception. The State cannot claim immunity based on its recharacterization of this 
suit as arising from the deceit of the parolee. 
C. The district court erred when it summarily dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims 
pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act 
The State erroneously asserts that "[t]he district court correctly dismissed all of 
[Appellants]' claims based on the immunity act." State Br. at 18. The State's claim is 
wrong for at least two reasons: (1) the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply in this 
case; (2) Appellants have not "attempted] to evade the statutory categories by 
recharacterizing the supposed cause of injury." State Br. at 19 (quoting Taylor, 927 P.2d 
at 164). 
First, as already demonstrated, the State cannot excuse its negligence and claim 
immunity based on the deceptive actions of the parolee. The State "did not perform any 
act that falls within the scope of the [deceit] exception." Francis, 2010 UT 62, f^ 16, 
Appellants' injuries did not result from actions that occurred on grounds "controlled by 
Utah governmental entities". Id t17. Appellants' injuries were not "directly related to 
actions performed by [the State]." Id. Lastly, allowing the State to claim immunity 
based on the deceit of the parolee falls directly within the "absurd and unfair results" of 
which Justice Durham forewarned in Taylor. Taylor, 927 P.2d at 166. The 
Governmental Immunity Act should not have been applied to any of Plaintiffs' claims, 
and therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims based on 
sovereign immunity. 
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Second, even if the Court finds that the Governmental Immunity Act applies to 
Plaintiffs' deceit claim, Plaintiffs' other claims are not "attempts to evade the statutory 
categories by recharacterizing the supposed cause of injury." State Br. at 19 (quoting 
Taylor, 927 P.2d at 164). Therefore, Plaintiffs' remaining claims should not have been 
dismissed pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act. 
As explained at length in Appellants' Opening Brief, "[t]his Court has already 
recognized the viability of claims against the State for negligent supervision of a 
parolee." Appellants' Opening Br. at 11 (citing Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282-83 
(Utah 1985)). This case is similar to Arguelles because the State is claiming immunity 
for an individual who was released on parole and due to negligent supervision and a 
failure, to require strict adherence to the terms of the parole, the parolee was able to injure 
another. The Arguelles court indicated that even though the State's actions "fell into the 
category of functions designed to be shielded," a claim of negligent supervision could 
proceed. Arguelles, 716 P.2d at 282. Despite its similarities, the State claims that 
Arguelles should not apply to this case simply because it "did not mention, much less 
construe, the immunities at issue here." State Br. at 20. Under this logic, however, none 
of the cases upon which the State has relied are applicable to this case because none of 
them have mentioned, much less construed, the deceit exception. Simply put, the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not shield the State from any of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Arguelles provides further reason to conclude that the district court erred in dismissing 
Appellants' claims for negligent supervision and failure to warn. Arguelles, 716 P.2d at 
282. 
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III. The incarceration exception to the immunity waiver does not apply because 
Richard Higgins was not incarcerated when he deceived Appellants. 
The State is correct that the district court "did not reach the incarceration 
exception." State Br. at 20. But the State is mistaken in its assertion that the Court "may 
affirm the district court's order dismissing the case on this alternative ground." Id. at 24. 
The parolee at issue, Richard Higgins, was not incarcerated. 
The State relies heavily on this Court's recent decision in Peck v. State, 2008 UT 
39, 191 P.3d 4. The Peck case, and other cases relied upon by the State, do not support 
the State's theory. In Peck, the plaintiff was injured "after Peck was arrested and 
handcuffed". Id.^1. In Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976), the injury was 
caused by an escaped "prisoner in the state prison," not a parolee who had been released. 
Finally, in Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the injury was 
caused by "an inmate at the Utah State Prison" who was being "escorted by two 
corrections officers.. .to attend court proceedings." In stark contrast to the parties in 
Peck, Epting, and Kirk, the parolee here was not incarcerated - he was on parole - and 
not subject to any kind of "spatial confinement or physical restriction." Whitney v. Div. 
ofJuv. Justice Servs., 2012 UT 12, f 13, - P.3d - . 
In Whitney, this Court found that when the injury was caused by one who had been 
placed in a "community-based proctor home," the incarceration exception did not apply. 
Whitney, 2012 UT 12, Tf 4. This Court rejected the State's broad interpretation of 
incarceration as occurring "whenever a party is under the control of the State and unable 
to be released without some kind of permission." Id. % 12 (citing Peck, 2008 UT 39, U 8). 
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Rather, this Court held that incarceration must "include an element of physical restriction 
or spatial confinement." Id, Tf 13. In Whitney, the 'prisoner' could "come and go [from 
the proctor home] at will" and there were "no locks that would have confined the proctor 
teens inside the home." Id f 4. Similarly, Richard Higgins, though in contravention of 
his parole, came and went from Utah at will and he was obviously not physically 
restricted to a certain area. Even if Richard Higgins had limits placed on his travel, so 
did the proctor teen in Whitney, and this Court still found that he was not incarcerated. 
See id. U 5 ("Dillon was not allowed to stay at either of his parents' homes."). Richard 
Higgins was obviously not under physical restrictions, and it is absurd for the State to 
argue that the entire State of Utah constitutes a spatial restriction. See State Br. at 24 
("his parole prohibited him from leaving Utah"). 
When the Appellants were injured by Richard Higgins he was not under arrest or 
handcuffed, he had not escaped from prison, and he was not being escorted by corrections 
officers. Richard Higgins was arguably less confined than the teenager in Whitney. The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of parole is "to help 
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, 
without being confined for the full term of the sentence imposed." Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 477, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2598, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 492 (1972) (emphasis added). 
Richard Higgins was not confined and he was not physically restrained. Therefore, the 
incarceration exception is not an alternative ground upon which this Court can affirm the 
dismissal of Plaintiffs'claims. 
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IV. The State's Motion to Dismiss was improperly considered by the district 
court. 
The State claims that the district court properly considered the Motion to Dismiss 
because "[governmental immunity is an immunity from suit and not just a defense to 
liability." State Br. at 25. The State's argument, however, is belied by the cases it cites 
in support of its claim. Therefore, the Court should find that the district court erred when 
it dismissed Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The State has mischaracterized several of the cases that purportedly support its 
theory. The State claims that "[i]f a complaint alleges facts showing that the State is 
immune, the case should be dismissed under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)." State Br. at 25. 
As support for this assertion, however, the State cites two cases that had nothing to do 
with Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In fact, the State falsely claims that the Peck case 
was an "interlocutory appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss." Id. While the Peck 
court mentioned the standard of review for a motion to dismiss, Peck, 2008 UT 39 ^ 2, it 
was based on "the district court's denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Id. 
17. Similarly, in S.H.ex rel R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993), the appeal was 
"from an order of summary judgment" not a motion to dismiss. In both cases, the State 
filed a responsive pleading prior to dismissal. 
Finally, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Court's discussion about 
immunity from suit revolved around the government's ability to dismiss a case on 
summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. Mitchell, All U.S. at 526 (explaining that 
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the qualified immunity doctrine was refashioned "to permit the resolution of many 
insubstantial claims on summary judgment") (internal quotations omitted). In addition to 
the State's mischaracterization of case law, it has offered nothing to rebut the many cases 
in support of Appellants' claim that the district court's consideration of the Motion to 
Dismiss was "untimely and contrary to Utah case law." See Appellants Opening Br. at 
24. 
This Court has made clear that "[ijmmunity is an affirmative defense which must 
be proved by the defendant." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). 
Notably, Nelson was "an appeal from summary judgment," not a motion to dismiss. Id. 
at 571. Further, this Court has made clear that raising an affirmative defense "for the first 
time in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not generally appropriate since dismissal under 
rule 12(b)(6) is justified only when the allegations of the complaint itselfclearly 
demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim." Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin 
Medical Center, Inc., 2005 UT App 325,110 n.6, 122 P.3d 891 (internal quotation 
omitted) (emphasis in original). The Complaint does not clearly demonstrate that 
Plaintiffs do not have claims, and therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed all 
of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) and sovereign immunity. 
Immunity is an affirmative defense and was not a proper basis of the State's 
Motion to Dismiss. While the State may have a right to avoid the "burdens of litigation" 
(State Br. at 25 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526)), that right is properly invoked after a 
responsive pleading has been filed. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (immunity doctrine 
avoids "costs of trial or...burdens of broad-reaching discovery" by "permitting] the 
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resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment"); see also S.H., 865 P.2d 
at 1364 (appealing dismissal based on immunity doctrine "from an order of summary 
judgment"); Peck, 2008 UT 30, ^ 7 (appealing denial "of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings" based on the immunity doctrine). The district court erred by ruling on an 
affirmative defense raised in the State's Motion to Dismiss. The Court should reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, and set forth in Appellants' Opening Brief, the Court 
should reverse the district court's grant of the State's Motion to Dismiss and allow 
Appellants' suit for damages caused by the State's negligence in supervising a parolee 
and in failing to warn them about the parolee to proceed. 
Dated this 16th day of May, 2012. 
MUMFORD RAWSON LLC 
Marcus R. Mumford 
Attorney for Appellants 
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